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THE DEVIL AND THE D.A.:
THE CIVIL ABATEMENT OF OBSCENITY
Obscenity has long been a plague to courts and legislatures seek-
ing ways to stem the rising tide of adult bookstores and theatres. Tra-
ditionally, obscenity has been dealt with through the criminal courts.
But the criminal law in this area has often been difficult to administer,
and frequently the first amendment has stood in the way of convic-
tions.' With the approval of the courts, prosecutors have turned in-
creasingly to civil proceedings to check the flow of obscene exhibi-
tions.2 California is no exception.
In the spring of 1976, the California Supreme Court issued its
opinion in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre.3 In that
case, the Los Angeles District Attorney brought a series of civil actions
seeking injunctive relief against the proprietors of adult bookstores and
theatres, basing his complaint on the public nuisance laws.' In ruling
against the defendants' demurrer, the court introduced a new pro-
cedure into California obscenity law, finding the civil public nuisance
statutes applicable to obscene exhibitions for the first time.5
The Busch Decision
What Busch Does
California defines a civil public nuisance as "anything which is in-
jurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses." The
court in Busch, reading "indecent" and "offensive to the senses" as
alternative bases of public nuisance, found that obscenity is indecent
and that it therefore falls under the code definition. Another code sec-
tion enables the district or city attorney to bring an action in equity to
abate a nuisance.7 Thus, the court generally approved District Attor-
1. For a thorough discussion of the problems the courts have encountered in their
dealings with obscenity, see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. For a general discussion of the use of equity in criminal cases, see Mack, The
Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 H.Av. L REV. 389 (1903).
3. 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1976).
4. Id. at 47, 550 P.2d at 602, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 330.
5. CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 3479-80 (West 1970).
6. Id. § 3479.
7. CAL. ConE CiV. PRoc. § 731 (West 1955).
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ney Busch's complaint, although it reserved judgment on the exact na-
ture of injunctive relief available.8
Having decided that obscenity is in fact a public nuisance, the
court then examined the constitutional objections-vagueness and prior
restraint-to the abatement procedure and found that the procedure
was adequate to overcome these objections. The court defended the
nuisance statute against the challenge of vagueness by construing the
term "indecent" to mean obscene as it is defined in Miller v. Califor-
nia.9
The court rejected the alternative theory of Busch's complaint,
which sought an injunction under the Red Light Abatement statute. 10
This statute enables the courts to close down buildings used for illegal
gambling, lewdness, assignation, and prostitution." In Busch, the
court concluded that the word "lewdness" must be read in the context
of the other provisions of the statute, that is, as referring to live sexual
conduct. Further, the court reasoned that if the legislature had in-
tended to include adult theatres and bookstores within the ambit of the
statute, it could have so provided, as it did with illegal gambling. 12
This introduction of the civil abatement procedure into California
obscenity law marks a significant shift away from previously recognized
law. Prior to Busch, the controlling law was found in Harmer v.
Tonylyn Productions, Inc." There the court of appeal rejected the
complaint of six private citizens seeking to enjoin the showing of a par-
ticular film on the ground that it was a public nuisance. The plaintiffs
had not alleged special damages to show that the exhibition of the film
resulted in any injury to them as members of the public:
[t]he film involved was shown only in a closed theatre. Only
those persons could view it who had paid the admission price and
who had entered the theatre. Thus, only those members of the
community were exposed to the film who voluntarily chose to see
it. . . . In the statute's terms, the alleged nuisance at bench did
not ". . . affect at the same time an entire community or neighbor-
hood. .... -14
Thus, Harmer stood for the proposition that adult establishments could
not be reached by the civil public nuisance statutes.15
8. 17 Cal. 3d at 60, 550 P.2d at 611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
9. Id. at 56, 550 P.2d at 608, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
10. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11225-35 (West 1970).
11. Id.
12. 17 Cal. 3d at 61, 550 P.2d at 611-12, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 339-40.
13. 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
14. Id. at 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 576-77 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West
1970)) (emphasis added).
15. See, e.g., People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 67-
68, 550 P.2d 600, 615, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 344 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
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Busch, then, was an abrupt about-face in California law. The
Busch court expressly rejected the reasoning in Harmer, observing that
it "misses the point.' 1 6 The public's interest in controlling obscene ex-
hibitions is not, said the court, diminished by the fact that such exhibi-
tions take place behind closed doors. In Harmer, the court implicitly
balanced the first amendment interests in showing and viewing such ma-
terial against the interest in avoiding involuntary exposure to it. The
Busch court recognized additional public interests that had to be
weighed. The presence of adult establishments in a community is a
public concern not because the general public is exposed to particular
films or books, but because the public has an overriding interest in the
moral content of any materials exhibited to any part of the community.
It has traditionally been within the state's authority to regulate and
oversee those matters which affect the public health, safety or morality,
and here lies the heart of the opinion-the state must have the power
over the exhibition of films and distribution of books in order to insure
that the public is protected from moral corruption. 17
The Ramifications of Busch
The Busch ruling has now cleared the way for the use of civil
public nuisance statutes to regulate obscenity. This type of proceeding
has several advantages over criminal proceedings, making it attractive
both to prosecutors and to the proprietors of adult establishments.' s
For the prosecutor, it is preferable because an injunction is a quicker
and more efficient way of halting the display of specific materials than
is a criminal penalty. The equitable remedy takes effect immediately
to prevent further display of the books or films. In contrast, a crim-
inal penalty is directed toward the proprietor as a punishment for ex-
hibiting the matter, addressing the material adjudged harmful only in-
directly. Further, the nuisance abatement procedure leaves the pros-
ecutor with two back-up measures. If the injunction is violated, he
can ask the court for contempt penalties. He also has the discretion
of charging the exhibitor with violation of the criminal obscenity law.
Finally, the prosecutor will be more likely to prevail in a civil proceed-
ing. The standard of proof is lower in a civil action than in a criminal
action: "beyond a reasonable doubt" is diminished to "preponderance
'16. Id. at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
17. See notes 105-108, 160-62 & accompanying text infra. The court also pointed
out that Harmer dealt with plaintiffs who were private citizens rather than public
officials. District or city attorneys have standing to sue under CAL. CODE Crv. PRoc. §
731 (West 1955). Thus, while the private citizen must allege special damages, the
district or city attorney satisfies the standing requirement merely by alleging general
damage to the public. 17 Cal. 3d at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
18. For a general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of public nuisance
as applied to adult theatres and bookstores, see Note, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 115 (1975).
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of the evidence."' 9  And since the action is in equity, the prosecutor
need prove his case only to the judge and not to a jury. The job of
proving the obscenity of the material is thus simplified, since the prose-
cutor need prove less under a lower standard of proof and he need con-
vince only one individual and not the whole jury.
The proprietors of adult establishments will also realize some ad-
vantages. If they have a chance to come into court and litigate the
issue of the obscenity of a particular film or book in a civil proceeding
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint, they will be able to deter-
mine what they can and cannot legally exhibit without incurring crim-
inal penalties. Also, the procedural rules which have been prescribed
by the courts reduce the chances of an unwarranted prior restraint.2"
Exhibitors can rely on the fact that they cannot be enjoined from dis-
playing materials until those materials have been adjudged obscene.
Still, the Busch decision is troublesome in some respects. Pro-
cedurally, use of an equity approach takes away from the exhibitor of
adult materials some of the safeguards he would have had as a criminal
defendant. Although it might be argued that it is reasonable to sacri-
fice some procedural safeguards for the opportunity to avoid criminal
penalties, still the proprietor is governed by a lower standard of proof
in a civil case than in a criminal case. This means that there is a
slightly greater risk that materials which would have been found pro-
tected by the first amendment in a criminal court will go unprotected
in a court of equity. In addition, the proprietor loses the right to a
jury trial on the issue of obscenity. This would seem to fly in the face
of Miller v. California's implicit assumption that it would be a jury that
would formulate the community standards by which to judge the ob-
scenity of a book or film.2'
The Busch decision is also troublesome insofar as it is questionable
whether obscene exhibitions can properly be said to come under the
jurisdiction of the civil public nuisance statutes. It is not clear that the
public nuisance abatement statute was designed to cover this kind of
situation. Justice Tobriner in his dissenting opinion suggested that
public nuisance abatement was intended as an extraordinary remedy,
reserved for those situations in which the public interest is immediate
19. People v. Frangadakis, 184 Cal. App. 2d 540, 550, 7 Cal. Rptr. 776, 782
(1960).
20. For a discussion of prior restraint and its problems, see notes 24-44 &
accompanying text infra.
21. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See notes 54-66 & accompanying text infra. It is notable
that the Miller case expanded the role of the jury in a unique way. Traditionally it is
the judge who gives the law to the jury to apply. But in obscenity trials following
Miller, it is the jury that in effect makes the law as it formulates the applicable
community standards.
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and its protection cannot be deferred until other remedies can be em-
ployed.2 2 Further, it would appear from the history of public nuisance
cases that the statutes were written with the intention of dealing with
those conditions which offend the five senses, such as noxious odors
or excessive noise.23 Finally, the court's assertions aside, it is question-
able whether the exhibition of obscene materials "behind closed doors"
to consenting adults is in fact a public nuisance; is the public truly in-
jured if such exhibitions are allowed to continue? These problem
areas in the Busch decision will be discussed below. Before turning
to these areas, however, it is necessary to discuss the manner in which
Busch seeks to protect first amendment interests.
Procedure: Busch and Prior Restraint
Any system of prior restraint . . . comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The pre-
sumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree
of protection broader-than that against limits of expression im-
posed by criminal penalties. Behind the distinction is a theory
deeply etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few
who abuse the rights of speech after they break the law than to
throttle them and all others beforehand.
24
The problem of avoiding prior restraints is one of the most trou-
blesome that the courts have encountered when they have sought to
enjoin obscene displays. 25  The civil abatement procedure runs the
grave risk that materials protected by the first amendment may be
swept away with the unprotected. The California court in Busch ex-
amined the procedural pitfalls into which other courts have fallen and
read into the California public nuisance abatement law requirements
designed to circumvent this problem.
2
6
The United States Supreme Court has, in a series of cases, set
down guidelines to save civil proceedings in this area from constitu-
tional infirmity. First, the censor must have the burden of proving that
the materials are unprotected rather than the exhibitor having to prove
them protected. 7 Under California's public nuisance abatement law,
the district or city attorney who brings the action has this burden. The
22. 17 Cal. 3d at 63, 550 P.2d at 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
23. See notes 96-102 & accompanying text infra.
24. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) (cita-
tions omitted). See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
25. See cases cited in People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d
42, 57-58, 550 P.2d 600, 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 337-38 (1976).
26. Id.
27. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). Accord, Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
697, 713 (1930).
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exhibitor cannot be required to show cause why the injunction should
not issue.
28
The second procedural requirement established by the Supreme
Court is that there must be an adversary judicial hearing prior to the
imposition of any restraint upon the exhibition of questionable mate-
rial.29 Thus, until the material has been judicially found to be obscene,
it enjoys the same protection under the first amendment as any other
expression.' 0 The Busch court has made it clear that no injunction can
issue until the material has been found unprotected in an adversary set-
ting.3 1 Thus, the exhibitor has ample opportunity to present his side
of the case and to defend the materials against a charge of obscenity. 2
Although the public nuisance abatement statute does not provide for
such a hearing, the court felt "obliged to construe and interpret legisla-
tion in a manner which will uphold its validity.""
The third procedural safeguard set by the Supreme Court is that
there must be assurance of a prompt, final decision by a court. 34  The
Busch requirement of a full adversary hearing before a court35 satisfies
this requirement.
Finally, the order must be framed as narrowly and precisely as
the needs of the case allow.' 6 A common ground for reversal in many
cases considering this issue has been that the injunction has closed
down the premises altogether.' 7 A blanket injunction of this variety
is too broad because it "does not put the seller on notice as to what
is prohibited, and thereby creates an unacceptable restraint upon his
28. Cf. Monterey Club v. Superior Court, 48 Cal. App. 2d 131, 146-47, 119 P.2d
349 (1941) (observing that requiring the defendant to show cause in a public nuisance
abatement action would be similar to requiring a criminal defendant to prove his own
innocence).
29. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58. See also Commonwealth v. Guild
Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 381, 248 A.2d 45, 47 (1968).
30. Flack v. Municipal Court, 66 Cal. 2d 981, 989, 429 P.2d 192, 198, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 872, 878 (1967).
31. 17 Cal. 3d at 59, 550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
32. In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975), the
Court indicated that any preliminary injunction imposed prior to judicial review would be
valid only if imposed for a brief and specific period to preserve the status quo. For
instance, if an injunction is needed to prevent destruction of the subject matter, it may be
approved. Accord, Grove Press, Inc. v. Flask, 326 F. Supp. 574, 579 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
The court in Busch did not address this point.
33. 17 Cal. 3d at 60, 550 P.2d at 610-611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338-339.
34. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965).
35. 17 Cal. 3d at 60, 550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
36. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 184 (1968).
37. See, e.g., Oregon Bookmark Corp. v. Schrunk, 321 F. Supp. 639 (D. Ore.
1970); State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc. v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Ct. App.
1972); New Riviera Arts Theatre v. State ex rel. Davis, 219 Tenn. 652, 412 S.W.2d 890
(1967).
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freedom to vend publications. 'a  A blanket injunction prevents the
premises from being operated legitimately to exhibit protected mate-
rials.3 9 Finally, a statute authorizing the shutdown as a public nuisance
of any place which exhibits obscene materials could be applicable even
to private houses. This is clearly impermissible. 40
Accordingly, Busch held that injunctive relief must be" 'proper and
suitable,'" to the facts of the case.41 "'Proper and suitable'" essentially
means that the injunction must be directed towards specific materials.
42
The court stated that the closure of the premises would result in an
unwarranted prior restraint.43  The injunction must apply only to those
materials which have been adjudged obscene and thus are not pro-
tected by the first amendment.44
In summary, the California court has followed closely the guide-
lines set out by the United States Supreme Court and has established
a system which enables the courts to issue injunctions against the ex-
hibition of obscene materials without violating the first amendment.
The burden is on the complainant to prove the material obscene. A
full adversary hearing before a court on the issue of obscenity is re-
quired before an injunction can issue. Finally, the court has required
that the injunction be drawn as narrowly and specifically as possible.
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the California court,
however, has addressed two other issues which may ultimately have
great impact on how effectively the first amendment is in fact pro-
tected-the lower standard of proof and the absence of a jury in an
equity case. It is necessary to ask how helpful this system of avoiding
improper prior restraints can be when the nature of the proceeding
makes it easier for the prosecutor to win his case.
Procedure: Standard of Proof and Juries
Civil proceedings by the state against the display of obscene ma-
terials are quickly becoming one of the most popular methods of deal-
ing with obscenity. Busch has opened the door for such proceedings
to take the place of criminal prosecutions. Rarely, however, have the
courts examined the criminal law origins of the offense. Even less fre-
38. Mitchem v. State ex reL Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1971).
39. Accord, Sanders v. State, 231 Ga. 608, 203 S.E.2d 153 (1974); Gulf States
Theatres, Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La. 1973).
40. Airways Theatre, Inc. v. Canale, 366 F. Supp. 343 (W.D. Tenn. 1973). See
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
41. 17 Cal. 3d at 57, 550 P.2d at 609, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 337 (quoting Guttinger
v. Calaveras Cement Co., 105 Cal. App. 2d 382, 390, 233 P.2d 914, 919 (1951)).
42. 17 Cal. 3d at 57, 550 P.2d at 609, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
43. Id. at 58, 550 P.2d at 609-10, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 337-38.
44. Id, at 59, 550 P.2d 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
July 1977] 1335
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
quently, if ever, have the courts insisted that the procedural safeguards
which characterize criminal cases be applied to civil cases of this na-
ture.45 While the defendant in an equity action does not risk punish-
ment upon a finding that the material is obscene, he may run a greater
risk that the material will be found unprotected because of the lower
standard of proof and the absence of a jury." 6
Standard of Proof
Few courts treating the abatement of obscene exhibitions have
raised the possibility that "preponderance of the evidence" might be
an insufficient standard by which to measure the evidence when first
amendment rights are at stake. This omission indicates implicit ap-
proval of the lower standard.
Justice Brennan, concurring in McKinney v. Alabama,4 7 suggested
that the states should be required to prove the obscenity of a work be-
yond a reasonable doubt, even though the judgment was to be had in
a civil proceeding. The first amendment guarantee of freedom of ex-
pression, Brennan reasoned, has a "'transcending value.' "48 When an
individual
has at stake an interest of transcending value, [the] margin of error
is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party
the burden . . . of persuading the factfinder . . . of [the existence
of the fact] beyond a reasonable doubt. 49
The standard of reasonable doubt offers an added margin of pro-
tection between legitimate expressions and the impositions of penalties.
It diminishes the hazard of erroneous suppression of speech which falls
close to the line separating the protected from the unprotected. 0
Particularly in the area of obscenity, where the distinction between the
permissible and the prohibited is inherently vague, 5 the state should
45. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975), the Supreme Court
recognized the quasi-criminal nature of such proceedings. Applying the doctrine of fed-
eral discretionary abstention in criminal cases enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971), to a state public nuisance abatement proceeding similar to that in Busch, the
Court said, "[Mie deal here with a state proceeding which in important respects is more
akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a party to the
Court of Common Pleas proceeding, and the proceeding is both in aid of and closely
related to criminal statutes which prohibit the dissemination of obscene materials."
46. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63, 550 P.2d
600, 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); McKinney v.
Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 683-84 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Bantam
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 69 (1963).
47. 424 U.S. 669, 678 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 684 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958)).
49. Id.
50. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
51. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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be required to meet this higher standard of proof. The potential for
mistaken factfinding is too great a burden on first amendment freedoms
when the result of such a factfinding error may be to enjoin legitimate
and protected expressions.
52
Furthermore, Brennan averred, because preponderance of the
evidence standard increases the potential for penalizing legitimate ex-
pression, the risk of self-censorship becomes too great. 53  This "chilling
effect" on expression goes to the heart of the first amendment: when
the public swallows its words for fear of crossing a grey and indistinct
line, the integrity of any free expression has been seriously com-
promised. While this danger, of course, still exists when the standard
of proof is raised to a reasonable doubt, the risk is minimized.
The majority in Busch did not address the issue of standard of
proof. It is a serious issue and should have been considered, for when
the likelihood of error is high, all precautions taken to prevent unwar-
ranted prior restraint are diminished in value.
Trial by Jury
In his Busch dissent, Justice Tobriner asserted:
By permitting a city attorney who objects to certain material to
wield this remedy. . . the majority endangers freedom of expres-
sion to an extent never before contemplated in this state. Here-
after, the public's right to read books or magazines, to view plays
or motion pictures, can be permanently curtailed if a city attorney
can find a single judge who believes the material is obscene.5 4
When the United States Supreme Court articulated its latest in a
series of legal definitions of obscenity, implicit in its opinion was the
notion that the trier of fact would be a jury and not a judge. In Miller
v. California,55 Chief Justice Burger favored the use of a jury to apply
community standards in reaching a decision as to whether a particular
work is obscene. In this way, a work will be judged by its "impact
on an average person."56
52. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
53. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 685-86 (1976) (Brennan, L, concur-
ring).
54. 17 Cal. 3d at 63, 550 P.2d at 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 341 (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
55. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Court defined obscenity as follows: "works
which, taken as a whole, appeal to a prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
"The basic guidelines for the trier of fact [include] whether 'the average person,
applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... "
56. Id. at 33 (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1966)).
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The whole thrust of the Miller approach is to allow the tastes of
the community to surface. As the Court observed in Hamling v.
United States,57 a later case interpreting the Miller standard, it is the
juror who is best suited to draw on the standards of the community in
deciding what materials would offend the general tastes of the area.
58
It was precisely because the Court had such difficulty in formulating
standards of obscenity to apply across the country that it decided in
Miller to return the decision to the members of the community in which
the action is brought.59 The Court's delegation of this formulation to
the jury is defeated if the jury is removed from the decision process
and a judge is substituted in an equity proceeding.
Miller and Hamling were both criminal cases in which the defend-
ants faced penalties harsher than injunctions if the materials they dis-
tributed were found obscene. Undoubtedly, the need for a jury trial
under these circumstances is more compelling than it is when the pro-
ceeding is equitable in nature. Nonetheless, in a quasi-criminal public
nuisance proceeding such as Busch, the line between protected and un-
protected expression is subjectively drawn at best. Thus, the right to
a jury trial is an important means of assuring that there will be an ap-
propriate determination of the issue. The question of what is obscene
is preferably left to the jury because, as was said in a Second Circuit case,
it is the jury that can "most nearly satisf[y] the moral demands of the
community . . . '[O]bscenity' is a function of many variables, and
the verdict of the jury is . . . really a small bit of legislation ad hoc,
like the standard of care." 60  A judge making the decision on his own,
no matter how objective he endeavors to be, must inevitably make the
determination on the basis of his own subjective notions of decency.
He is "distant to the interplay of the diverse cultural, religious, intel-
lectual, and economic backgrounds commonly present in a jury room"61
and cannot bring to bear on his decision all the varying attitudes of the
community in which his court sits. Thus, the entire Miller reliance on
community standards as developed by a miniature community in the
jury room is emasculated in an equity proceeding. Substituted is a
single judge's notion of what can or should be tolerated in the commu-
nity.
At least one case since the Miller decision has required a jury trial
on the issue of obscenity when the work was to be enjoined.62  The
57. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
58. Id. at 105.
59. 413 U.S. at 30.
60. United States v. Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 157 (2d Cir. 1936).
61. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 73, 550 P.2d
600, 620, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 348 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
62. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975); see 1024 Peachtree Corp. v.
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Missouri Supreme Court recognized that in injunctive proceedings the
use of a jury is irregular. But, said the court, "judges do not ordinarily
act as fact-finders as to the propensities of a 'reasonable' person in tort
law. In 'obscenity' cases, we believe we should 'rely on the jury sys-
tem' [as mandated by Miller]."63 The Missouri court set up a system
whereby an advisory jury would render a special verdict on the issue
of obscenity. If the jury finds that the work is not obscene, its deci-
sion is binding on the court, and injunctive relief will be denied. If,
however, the jury finds that the work is obscene, the court must make
an independent judgment of whether the material is constitutionally
protected, thus making doubly sure that no material is unconstitu-
tionally suppressed. Thus, the system works much like the criminal
process-a finding of "not guilty" is conclusive, but a guilty verdict can
be set aside by the judge.64
The majority report of the President's Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography has also recommended that a jury trial be instituted in
these cases in its model legislation. The Hill-Link minority report con-
curred on this point, arguing that a jury has a "special aptitude for ex-
pressing the view of the average person," and, "[als the trier of fact,
it is the exclusive judge of the common conscience of the community.
"65
Militating against the inclusion of a jury trial are cases decided
prior to Miller, holding that a jury trial on the issue of obscenity in an
equitable proceeding is not guaranteed by the Constitution.66 The
seventh amendment preserves the right to a civil jury trial only where
the right existed at common law, and generally, courts have not en-
deavored to expand its meaning to include equitable cases which are
criminal in origin.
Slaton, 228 Ga. 102, 184 S.E.2d 144 (1971), where the court permitted a preliminary
injunction to issue only until such time as a jury could decide the issue of obscenity.
63. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975).
64. Id. at 348.
65. U.S. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON OBSCENITY & PORNOGRAPHY, THE REPORT OF
THE COMMISSION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY 464, 474 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as COMMISSION].
66. E.g., Gerstein v. "Pleasure Was My Business," 136 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Ct. App.
1961); Rachleff v. Mahon, 124 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Ct. App. 1960); Corinth Publications,
Inc. v. Wesberry, 221 Ga. 704, 146 S.E.2d 764 (1966); cf. Haldeman v. United States,
340 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1965); State v. A Quantity of Books, 191 Kan. 13, 370 P.2d 254
(1963); Commonwealth v. Moniz, 338 Mass. 442, 155 N.E.2d 762 (1959). See also
People v. Frangadakis, 184 Cal. App. 2d 340, 7 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960). One court
likened the injunction proceeding to a misdemeanor criminal prosecution for obscenity,
where the defendant would not be entitled to a jury trial. State ex rel. Beil v. Mahoning
Valley Distrib. Agency, Inc., 84 Ohio L. Abs. 427, 169 N.E.2d 48 (1960).
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In light of tradition, it is clear that the decisions denying the right
to a jury trial are sound-courts of equity have never commonly em-
ployed juries. The majority of courts which have considered the in-
junction of obscene displays in the aftermath of Miller have not recon-
sidered the use of juries in these proceedings. Similarly, the court in
Busch did not address this issue. But the Miller standard, combined
with the increasing use of civil proceedings to reach what had pre-
viously been treated as a criminal offense, demands a reconsideration
of the use of juries and a recognition of the right to a jury trial on the
issue of obscenity in this specific variety of equitable proceeding.
Obscenity and Public Nuisance
Public Nuisance Defined
At common law, a public nuisance was defined as any public ex-
hibition which tended to corrupt the morals or disturb the general good
order or welfare of society. 67 Nuisances which involved offenses to the
moral sensibilities of the community were considered malum in se, and
were enjoinable "irrespective of their location and results."'68 Thus,
at common law, there was no need to prove injury to the community
if the nuisance was in fact an offense to its moral decency.
When California enacted statutes to cover the field of public nui-
sance, the statutory definitions superseded those at common law. 69
Separate provisions were made for criminal public nuisance and civil
public nuisance, only the latter being subject to equitable remedies.70
Criminal and civil nuisances were distinguishable not only by the nature
of the remedies but also by the frequency with which each was called
into action. Equity courts were used much more sparingly than were
criminal courts.
7 1
The Civil Code definition of public nuisance includes "[a]nything
which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to the senses
.... -72 Similarly, the penal code definition includes "[a]nything
which is injurious to health, or is indecent, or offensive to the senses.
S. .- The two definitions differ in that the criminal definition in-
67. "Under this head are included . . .obscene pictures, and any and all exhibi-
tions, the natural tendency of which is to pander to vicious tastes, and to draw together
the vicious and disorderly members of society." H. WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 68
(3d ed. 1893). Cf. State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372 (1942).
68. J. JoYCE, NuisANcEs § 15 (1906).
69. People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); Kreling v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 2d 884, 886, 118 P.2d 470, 471 (1941).
70. See People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 878-80, 118 P.2d 472, 475-76 (1941).
71. Cf. id. at 880, 118 P.2d at 476.
72. CAL. CiV. CODE § 3479 (West 1970).
73. CAL. PEN. CODE § 370 (West 1970).
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cludes a vital comma after the word "indecent," while the civil version
does not.
Although the Busch court was primarily concerned with the
proper use of the civil public nuisance abatement statute,74 it applied
the penal definition of public nuisance to obscenity.75 Assuming that
the penal and civil definitions of public nuisance were exactly the same
and therefore interchangable, the court cited the penal definition and
concluded that "the proscribed act may be anything which alternatively
is . . indecent, or offensive to the senses .. *"76 Under this inter-
pretation, an exhibition which is indecent (i.e., offensive to the morals
of the community), is enjoinable as a public nuisance even though the
senses of the community have not been assaulted."7
Justice Tobriner, dissenting, saw a subtle but significant impor-
tance in the comma which appears in the penal definition, but not in
the civil definition of public nuisance.78  The distinction is that in the
penal statute indecency and offensiveness would appear to be listed in
the alternative, while in the civil statute it would appear that both in-
decency and offensiveness pertain to the senses. Justice Tobriner thus
remarked that "if we must choose which section is correct, we should
honor the definition in the Civil Code."
79
The distinction made by Justice Tobriner is supported by People
v. Seccombe,80 where the court saw civil public nuisances falling into
four distinct categories, including "(a) injurious to the health," and
"(b) indecent or offensive to the senses. . .8." The fact that the
Seccombe court felt the word "indecent" modified the word "senses"
becomes meaningful when it is noted that the public nuisance abate-
ment statute refers specifically to the civil definition of public nui-
sance.
8 2
The different approaches followed by the majority and the dissent
to reach the meaning of public nuisance lead to diametrically opposed
conclusions. If the penal and civil definitions are indeed interchang-
able, then indecency in and of itself is enjoinable. But if the civil def-
inition does require that the injury be to the senses, it is not clear that
obscene displays in adult theatres and bookstores behind closed doors
would fall under that category.
74. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 731 (West 1955).
75. 17 Cal. 3d at 49, 550 P.2d at 603, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 331.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
78. Id. at 65, 550 P.2d at 614, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 342 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
79. Id.
80. 103 Cal. App. 306, 284 P. 725 (1930).
81. Id. at 309-10, 284 P. at 726 (emphasis added). Contra, Weis v. Superior
Court, 30 Cal. App. 730, 733, 159 P. 464, 465 (1916).
82. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 731 (West 1955).
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The majority in Busch relies heavily on Weis v. Superior Court8 3
to support its finding that an offense to the public decency is a public
nuisance under the Civil Code. In Weis the court approved an injunc-
tion against the operator of an amusement center open to the general
public, which featured nude dancing. 84  The court held that perfor-
mances of this variety were offensive to the public decency and were
enjoinable under the common law definition of public nuisance.85
The Busch majority, however, overlooked important features
which distinguish Weis from cases such as Busch. The court in Weis,
although it cited California Civil Code section 3479, actually relied on
the common law definition of public nuisance, which, as noted above,
included offenses against public decency. Subsequent cases have held,
however, that the common law definition is no longer applicable under
California law.86 Also, in Weis, admission to the exhibition was con-
ducted in such a way that the general public could be exposed to the
nudity by surprise. Unlike the "X-rated" bookstores and theatres of
the 1970's, the "Sultan's Harem" exhibition in Weis displayed no warn-
ing to the public that the entertainment was "adults only" in nature.
Thus, the sense of the unsuspecting public could have been assaulted.8
The majority also cited People v. Lim88 as support for both its
reading of Weis and its conclusion in Busch. In Lim, the court upheld
a district attorney's complaint seeking an injunction against a gambling
house on the grounds that by "encouraging dissolute habits . . . and
corrupting the public morals,"8 9 it was a public nuisance. The Busch
majority assumed that the court's action in Lim, supported its interpreta-
tion of the meaning of public nuisance. 90 A careful reading, however,
suggests that the Lim court held that the complaint alleged sufficient
facts to withstand a demurrer not because of the gambling house's ef-
fect on the public's morals, but because such an establishment draws
together "[c]rowds of disorderly people who disturb the peace and
. . . may. . . impair the free enjoyment of life and property and give
rise to the hazards designated in the statute."9 In other words, Lim's
holding is based not on the "indecency" of the gambling house, but
83. 30 Cal. App. 730, 159 P. 464 (1916).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 732-33, 159 P. at 465 (citing J. JOYCE, NUISANCES § 409 (1906)); H.
WOOD, THE LAW OF NUISANCES § 68 (3d ed. 1893).
86. People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941); Kreling v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 2d 884, 886, 118 P.2d 470, 471 (1941).
87. For a further discussion of what is public, see text accompanying notes 122-40
infra.
88. 18 Cal. 2d 872, 118 P.2d 472 (1941).
89. Id. at 874, 118 P.2d at 473.
90. 17 Cal. 3d at 50, 550 P.2d at 604, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332.
91. 18 Cal. 2d at 882, 118 P.2d at 477.
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rather on the physical disturbance its operation tended to cause. This
reading of Lim supports neither the Weis nor the Busch conclusion. 2
Further California case law on the subject of regulation of morals
through civil public nuisance is sparse. A sampling of other public nui-
sance abatement cases indicates that, in the past, courts have commonly
looked for evidence of tangible physical injury to the public.9 3 The
previous case law thus appears to support the Tobriner view that public
injury is that which is indecent or offensive to the senses and not that
which is indecent only in the moral sense of the word. Justice To-
briner persuasively argued that public nuisance abatement was in-
tended as an extraordinary remedy, designed to deal with immediate
perils to the public welfare, such as noxious odors and riots.94 These
immediate perils involve some degree of physical injury.
It is suggested, then, that the California civil nuisance law as it
stood at the time of the Busch decision did not encompass the abate-
ment of pornographic exhibitions behind closed doors. The question
becomes whether the court had the authority to expand the meaning
of public nuisance to include adult theatres and bookstores. As was
stated in a court of appeal opinion:
The general rule is that where the Legislature has not enacted stat-
utes specifying that an activity contrary to public policy constitutes
a public nuisance which may be enjoined in an action on behalf
of the state, the courts will not ordain such jurisdiction for them-
selves.95
Thus, while the legislature is fully empowered to include under public
nuisance abatement jurisdiction those matters of public policy which were
enjoinable at common law,9 when it has not done so, "[c]ourts of
equity enjoy no roving commission to define public nuisances. ' 97 This
92. In fact, Lim would seem to throw the whole matter of regulating morals back
at the legislature. That is, courts of equity should have jurisdiction over standards of
public morality only when the legislature has specifically delineated those areas. See 18
Cal. 2d at 879, 118 P.2d at 476.
93. See, e.g., Varney & Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 P. 867 (1909)
(esthetically unpleasing billboards could not be considered public nuisances); People v.
Oliver, 86 Cal. App. 2d 885, 195 P.2d 926 (1948) (littered yard was a public nuisance
because it presented a fire hazard, but not because it was unsightly); Dean v. Powell
Undertaking Co., 55 Cal. App. 545, 550, 203 P. 1015, 1017 (1921) (undertaking parlor
was not a nuisance because there was no showing of discomfort" 'through the medium of
the senses'" as opposed to the "'delicacy of taste or a refined fancy"' (quoting Westcott
v. Middleton, 43 N.J. Eq. 478, 486, 11 A. 490, 494 (Ch. 1887)).
94. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63, 550 P.2d
600, 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
95. People v. Johnson, 129 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 277 P.2d 45, 49 (1954).
96. People v. Lim, 18 Cal. 2d 872, 877, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (1941).
97. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 63, 550 P.2d
600, 613, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 341 (1976) (Tobriner, J., dissenting); accord, People v.
Robin, 56 Cal. App. 2d 885, 887, 133 P.2d 436, 438 (1943).
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is particularly so when those policy considerations are generally en-
forced by the criminal law.
Furthermore, when a statute has been construed by a judicial de-
cision and the legislature does not subsequently change the rule of law,
the courts have frequently held that the legislature has impliedly ap-
proved that judicial construction. 98 Following the decision in Harmer
v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc.99 in 1972 that the showing of pornographic
films did not constitute a civil public nuisance, a measure was placed
on the November ballot which, if approved, would have amended the
obscenity law under the Penal Code.10 The proposition would, among
other things, have given the courts the authority to enjoin the exhibition
of obscene books, films, and other media.' The ballot measure was
defeated by a margin of two to one. 10 2  Two years later, a bill was in-
troduced into the California State Assembly which would have accom-
plished the same purpose as the ballot measure. 10 3  It died in commit-
tee.'
04
From the foregoing, it is indicated that both the public and the
legislature had tacitly approved the rule of Harmer. The Busch major-
98. People v. Hallner, 43 Cal. 2d 715, 719, 277 P.2d 393, 396 (1954).
99. 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 100 Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
100. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 313-13.5 (West 1970).
101. Chapter 7.9 of Proposition 19 on the November 1972 ballot, if passed, would
have specifically given the courts jurisdiction to enjoin the sale, distribution, or showing
of particular printed materials and films in actions brought by district attorneys. It also
provided for trial on the issues and for the seizure and destruction of the materials in the
event an injunction was issued. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17
Cal. 3d 42, 70 n.4, 550 P.2d 600, 618, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 346 (1976) (Tobriner, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. It is only fair to point out that this proposition offered several other
amendments to the obscenity law which received the lion's share of the publicity.
103. A.B. 4340 (1974). This bill, inter alia, would have added Penal Code § 311.3,
reading in part as follows: "(a) The superior court has jurisdiction to enjoin the sale,
distribution or exhibition of obscene books, articles or films, as hereinafter
specified: (1) The district attorney, county counsel, city attorney or city prosecutor of
any county, city or town, in which a person, firm or corporation sells, distributes or
exhibits or is about to sell, distribute or exhibit or has in his possession with intent to
sell, distribute or exhibit any book, magazine, pamphlet, comic book, story paper,
writing, paper, picture, drawing, photograph, film, figure, image or any written or printed
matter of an indecent character which is obscene as defined in Section 311, may
maintain an action for an injunction against such person, firm or corporation in the
superior court to prevent the sale or further sale or the distribution or the further
distribution or exhibition or further exhibition of such matter. (2) The person, firm or
corporation sought to be enjoined shall be entitled to a trial of the issues within 14 days
after the joinder of issue and a decision shall be rendered by the court within two days of
the conclusion of the trial."
104. A.B. 4340 was reported out of the Criminal Justice Committee on November
30, 1974 without action. CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, FINAL CALENDAR OF LEGISLATIVE
BUSINESS 1973-74, pt. 2, at 2108 (1975).
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ity overstepped its authority to read into California law civil measures
which could not find approval among the voters or the legislators. It
is suggested that the court should have remained within the legisla-
tively approved confines of public nuisance law.
Civil Remedies in Other Jurisdictions
Outside of California, civil remedies against the exhibition of ob-
scene materials-usually injunctive-have been widely adopted. Un-
like California, the states in which these remedies have been used gen-
erally have enacted statutes either providing for injunctive relief in ob-
scenity cases or declaring obscene exhibitions to be public nuisances.
Thus it is important to examine how other states have used civil pro-
cedures to regulate obscenity and to discuss the nature of the state's
interest in regulating obscene displays.
The United States Supreme Court has generally accepted the use
of civil proceedings to reach obscene exhibitions. Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton'0 5 is one of the landmark cases approving the injunction of
obscene exhibitions. Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority that,
"assuming the use of a constitutionally acceptable standard for deter-
mining what is unprotected by the First Amendment," injunctive pro-
ceedings are perfectly acceptable. 1 6 The Court based its opinion on
a broad interpretation of the state police power:
[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide
of commercialized obscenity . . . These include the interest of
the public in the quality of life and the total community environ-
ment, the tone of commerce in the great city centers, and, possibly,
the public safety itself.107
At the bottom of the opinion is a strong belief in the right of a state
"to maintain a decent society.'
0 8
The United States Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere
with the states' exercise of their police power in the area of obscenity
when first amendment rights have not been directly violated. The ap-
proach to be used by the state-whether civil, criminal, or a combina-
tion of the two-is a matter "within the legislature's range of
choice."109 Recently, the Court, applying the principle of federal ab-
105. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
106. Id. at 55. Although Georgia has no statute authorizing injunctive relief in
obscenity cases, a separate section in the penal code declares that violation of the penal
obscenity law constitutes a public nuisance. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-2103 (Harrison
1972). The Georgia court has allowed the abatement of this kind of nuisance. See,
e.g., Evans Theatre Corp. v. Slaton, 227 Ga. 377, 180 S.E.2d 712 (1971).
107. 413 U.S. at 57-58.
108. Id. at 69 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)).
109. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 441 (1957).
July 1977] 1345
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
stention, 11° declined to examine the first amendment objections to an
Ohio statutory scheme"' which provides for the abatement as a public
nuisance of adult theatres. 112  A federal district court, considering the
Ohio statutes in an earlier case, had upheld the scheme against a charge
of overbreadth, admitting, however, that "a nuisance statute is . .. an
imprecise tool with which to administer the regulation of obscenity
. . ,""3 While the Supreme Court abstained from interfering with the
ongoing state injunctive proceeding, it did give its implicit approval to
an Ohio decision upholding the statute's public nuisance approach."'
When injunctive proceedings against obscene displays have been
brought on the basis of general public nuisance statutes (as in Busch),
the courts have been more reluctant to approve of the approach than
they have been when the proceeding was specifically authorized by
statute. In Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia,"' the distributor
of "I Am Curious (Yellow)" sought an injunction to prevent the city
attorney from obtaining a preliminary injunction against the exhibition
of the film as a public nuisance.' The federal appeals court noted
that
as a standard for regulating First Amendment rights, neither "in-
jury to the public," nor "unreasonableness," standing alone, is suffi-
ciently narrow or precise to pass constitutional muster. . . . What
is encountered with the sprawling doctrine of public nuisance is an
attempt to restrict First Amendment rights by means analogous to
those under "a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under
a general and indefinite characterization, and leaving to the execu-
tive and judicial branches too wide a discretion in its applica-
tion.""
7
A later Pennsylvania case dealing with the same public nuisance
statute and an injunctive proceeding against "Deep Throat" and "The
110. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
111. Oluo REv. CODE ANN. § 3767.01 (Page 1973).
112. Huffman v. Pursue Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See Note, Obscenity and Ohio
Nuisance Statutes, 5 U. ToL. L. REv. 171 (1973).
113. Grove Press, Inc. v. Flast, 326 F. Supp. 574, 578 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
114. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 612 (1974) (citing State ex rel. Ewing
v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421
U.S. 923 (1975)). The Supreme Court also gave its tacit approval to the use of civil
proceedings in McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976).
115. 418 F.2d 82 (3d Cir. 1969).
116. The Pennsylvania public nuisance statute is as follows: "Whoever erects, sets
up, establishes, maintains, keeps or continues, or causes to be erected, set up, established,
maintained, kept or continued, any public or common nuisance is guilty of a misdemean-
or of the second degree.
"Where the nuisance is in existence at the time of the conviction ... the court, in
its discretion, may direct either the defendant or the sheriff of the county at the expense
of the defendant to abate the same." PENN. STAT. ANN., tit. 18 § 6504 (Purdon 1973).
117. Grove Press, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 418 F.2d 82, 88 (3d Cir. 1969)
(citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940)).
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Devil in Miss Jones" under a general public nuisance statute, also
found that an obscenity injunction could not be based on the general
public nuisance statute.118  While the Pennsylvania statute is more gen-
eral than the California statute, insofar as it does not provide any defini-
tion of public nuisance, the two are similar in that they do not, like
many other states, directly address the abatement of obscene exhibi-
tions. In both instances, the district attorneys start with the general
concept of public nuisance, which has been traditionally employed to
counter tangible physical injuries to the public.11 9 They try to apply
that concept to a matter traditionally left to the criminal law, which di-
rectly addresses the dissemination of obscenity. The Supreme Court
has looked carefully at attempts to employ a general common law stat-
ute when first amendment interests have not been intentionally ad-
dressed by the statute.
Other jurisdictions have generally treated "red light abatement"
statutes in much the same way as the California court in Busch did.120
When actions have been brought under these kinds of statutes, the
courts have commonly read terms such as "lewdness" or "obscenity"
to refer to live sex acts or prostitution and not to the exhibition of films
or books.' 21 Thus, such statutes have rarely been used to regulate
adult theatres and bookstores.
But Is It Public?
"A public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire
community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons
118. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 464 Pa. 435, 347 A.2d 290 (1975).
119. E.g., Maier v. City of Ketchikan, 403 P.2d 34 (Alaska 1965) (power line
which threatened the public safety); Rosehill Cemetary Co. v. City of Chicago, 352 Ill.
11, 185 N.E. 170 (1933) (aesthetic objection to the operation of cemetary in the
neighborhood rejected); Dulaney v. Fitzgerald, 227 Ky. 566, 13 S.W.2d 767 (1929)
(circus operated in a residential neighborhood threatened the enjoyment of private
property by drawing crowds, etc.); Westcott v. Middleton, 43 NJ, Eq. 478, 11 A. 490
(1887) (undertaking parlor caused imagined and not physical injury); Wade v. Fuller,
12 Utah 2d 299, 365 P.2d 802 (1961) (drive-in restaurant drew crowds of noisy people
and caused traffic jams). Contra, Farrell v. Cook, 16 Neb. 483, 20 N.W. 720 (1884)
(breeding horses in full public view likened to maintaining a brothel); State v. Ever-
hardt, 203 N.C. 610, 166 S.E. 738 (1932) (dance hall subversive to public order and
morals); Jones v. State, 38 Okla. 218, 132 P. 319 (1912) (turf club likened to a com-
mon gambling house).
120. See notes 10-12 & accompanying text supra.
121. E.g., People v. Goldman, 7 Ill. App. 3d 253, 287 N.E.2d 177 (1972) (applying
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 100%, § 1 (1971)), which allows for the abatement as a public
nuisance of buildings "used for purposes of lewdness, assignation, or prostitution"; State
ex rel. Cahalan v. Diversified Theatrical Corp., 396 Mich. 244, 240 N.W.2d 460 (1976).
Contra, General Corp. v. State ex rel. Sweeton, 294 Ala. 657, 320 So. 2d 668 (1975),
where the court held a red light abatement statute applicable to the exhibition of films
under the common law concept of public nuisance.
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.... ,,122 It was vigorously argued in Busch (as in many other cases)
that the "behind closed doors" exhibition of films, books, and other ma-
terials could not properly be categorized as a public nuisance, since only
those who chose to be exposed to the displays were affected by their
content.1
23
The court in Busch was ostensibly analyzing the nature of a public
nuisance. In so doing, however, the majority mingled the broad public
interest which has supported the regulation of obscenity in a constitu-
tional context with the more narrow public interest which characterizes
the law of public nuisance. The court relied largely on constitutionally
based arguments to support its conclusion that the public interest in
regulating obscenity is such that its exhibition can properly be classified
as a public nuisance. This confusion between constitutional and nui-
sance interests led the court to give a much broader sweep to the nui-
sance interest than it is normally entitled to receive.
Courts considering the regulation of obscenity in a constitutional
context have generally rejected the argument that exhibitions which
take place behind closed doors are outside the public concern. Chief
Justice Burger in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton "categorically disap-
prove[d]' 24 the "consenting adults" argument, citing a string of civil
rights cases in which the Court had treated movie theatres as public
and thus subject to regulation.'25 Burger argued that, traffic in pornog-
raphy being commerce, it falls under the state's police power, and the
state is empowered to regulate it to protect the public environment:
The issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or even
the majority, considers the conduct depicted as "wrong" or "sinful."
The States have the power to make a morally neutral judgment that
public exhibition of obscene material, or commerce in such mate-
rial, has a tendency to injure the community as a whole .... 126
Thus, underlying Burger's opinion is the implicit assumption that what
is at stake is less the moral fiber of those who voluntarily expose them-
selves to illicit erotica 27 than the ethical tone of the entire community.
122. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 1970).
123. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 51-52, 550
P.2d 600, 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, 333 (1976).
124. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973).
125. Id. at 65. Actually, this argument, albeit compelling, is deceptive. A clear
distinction can be drawn between the theatre which refuses to admit blacks and the
theatre which is open to all those adults who choose to enter. In the former cases, the
operative factor was the discrimination against an entire class of persons. This discrimi-
nation is clearly a public-and a constitutional--concern of great importance. Adult
theatres and bookstores are hardly analogous, their operation involving none of the
illegal discrimination of the civil rights cases. The public interest in cases such as Paris
Adult Theatre-if any-is of a radically different character.
126. Id. at 69.
127. But see note 146 & accompanying text infra.
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When free commerce in obscenity is permitted, the public as a whole
suffers, not from exposure to the materials but from the toleration of
its commerce within their midst.
128
If the state has the authority to regulate or even ban commerce
in pornography, what becomes of the right of the patron to receive the
materials? The Court in Stanley v. Georgia 29 observed:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas. . . This right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth is funda-
mental to our free society.1
30
A few years after the Stanley decision, the Court stepped back from
its broad-sweeping dictum, as if for the first time realizing the true im-
plication of its words. In the companion cases of United States v.
Reidel' s' and United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,132 the Court
interpreted the Stanley case as being grounded on the individual's right
to be free from unwarranted government intrusion into the privacy of
his home.133  The Court held that since Stanley was not based on a
right to receive information, it could not be used to support a corres-
ponding right to distribute information. 34
When the California court examined this matter in 1971, Justice
Tobriner pointedly remarked:
The rights of adults to possess, study, and enjoy all ideas in the
privacy of their homes would mean little if the state could effec-
tively foreclose all legal means of access to a designated category
of material by penalizing anyone who distributed it.' 35
Justice Tobriner was, however, in the minority. The court held that
public distribution was properly the subject of state regulation, even
if private possession of the same material was not. More recently, in
Paris Adult Theatre I, Justice Burger disputed the notion that ours
is a society of "[tiotally unlimited play for [the] free will"'136 of the
patron of adult establishments. The state, exercising its police power,
128. See generally Redlich v. Capri Cinema, Inc., 75 Misc. 2d 117, 118-19, 347
N.Y.S.2d 811, 813 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
129. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
130. Id. at 564 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
131. 402 U.S. 351 (1971).
132. 402 U.S. 363 (1971).
133. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971); United States v. Thirty-
Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971). . See also United States v. Twelve 200-
Foot Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); Grove Press, Inc. v. Flast, 326 F. Supp. 574
(N.D. Ohio 1970).
134. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).
135. People v. Luros, 4 Cal. 3d 84, 98, 480 P.2d 633, 643, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833, 838
(1971) (Tobriner, J., dissenting).
136. 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973).
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has the authority to "protect the weak, the uninformed, the unsuspect-
ing, and the gullible from the exercise of their own volition."' 3 7
The state's power to protect the vulnerable from exposure to
pornography is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in those cases
which deal with the protection of minors. States have frequently taken
special precautions to insure that children are denied access to mate-
rials which might prove harmful to them in their tender years.'1
8
The courts have recognized, however, that materials which may
have a deleterious effect upon children may not have the same effect
on adults. Thus, while generally approving such measures, courts have
scrutinized them closely to assure that in protecting youth, the state
does not "burn the house to roast the pig."139 This approach gives rise
to the proposition that while some materials may be regulated as to the
scope of their distribution, they may not be suppressed altogether.' °
Those cases which have held that the dissemination of materials may
not be totally prohibited have generally dealt with materials which are
not legally obscene. The argument can be made, however, that an un-
suspecting adult population could be protected, as are children, through
measures less pervasive than wholesale suppression. For example, the
uninformed, when warned that a film depicts sexual conduct explicitly
or that merchandise in a bookstore is of a potentially offensive nature,
ought not be taken seriously when they complain of unwanted expo-
sure. Such regulation by the state would serve to preserve the free
choice of those who would patronize such establishments with their
eyes open while protecting the sensibilities of the unwary.
Justice Tobriner took up the consenting adults argument in his
Busch dissent, observing that the public nuisance statutes were in-
tended to reach public conduct which interfered with the rights of a
substantial number of people. 4' Exhibitions within the confines of
theatres or bookstores, he remarked, amount to private behavior which
does not "obtrude upon those who never see them."'4 2  Justice To-
137. Id.
138. An illustration of such a law is found in Georgia, where a special section has
been added to the penal code to deal with the distribution of obscene materials to minors.
After a declaratory judgment has been rendered that the material is unfit for distribution
to minors, one who does so distribute the materials is subject to criminal prosecution.
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-9901a to 07a (1972).
139. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 3-80, 383 (1957).
140. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964); cf. Cinecom Theatres Midwest
States, Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 473 F.2d 1297, 1300 (7th Cir. 1973) (failure to limit
application to children was not necessarily fatal because the exhibition was at a drive-in
theatre).
141. Id. at 64-66, 550 P.2d at 613-15, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 341-43 (Tobriner, J., dis-
senting).
142. Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 615, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
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briner conceded that a considerable number of people may be dis-
tressed by the knowledge that such establishments are operating within
their community, but he rejected the notion that this discomfort was
substantial enough to bring the public nuisance laws into play: "So at-
tenuated a discomfort. . . is far too meager to command the protection
of the public nuisance statutes."' 3  Justice Tobriner's approach is the
same as that accepted in California prior to the Busch decision. In
Harmer v. Tonylyn Productions, Inc.,' the court had refused to en-
join the exhibition of a film as a public nuisance because, "[tihe nui-
sance was not one which is inflicted or imposed on the public.'
45
The closed theatres and bookstores which were the subjects of
Busch may be contrasted with drive-in theatres and street-corner news-
racks.' 4 A display in full view of members of the public, whether con-
senting or not, is distinctively and unarguably public in nature. Nu-
merous cases have held that drive-in theatres may be restrained from
showing adult films when they will be visible from public highways or
from residential areas. Such exhibitions have been held to be public
nuisances because they impose pictures upon people without their con-
sent, are distracting, cause traffic hazards, and so on.'
47
It is notable, however, that even in the area of drive-in theatres,
public nuisance statutes will not reach all displays. A city ordinance
which prohibited the screening of all films which depicted human nud-
ity was invalidated by the Supreme Court in Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville:
148
Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker
intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity
makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure.
[T]he burden normally falls upon the viewer to "avoid
further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his]
eyes.149
In summary, then, it is clear that the courts have recognized a
strong public interest in the regulation of obscenity even when its ex-
143. Id.
144. 23 Cal. App. 3d 941, 104) Cal. Rptr. 576 (1972).
145. Id. at 943, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Similarly, in State v. Brooks, - Ore.
550 P.2d 440 (1976), the court overturned a conviction for public indecency for a nude
performance in an "adults only" theatre, observing that the patrons were forewarned
about the content of the performance and should not have been shocked.
146. See Note, Restricting the Public Display of Offensive Materials: The Use and
Effectiveness of Public and Private Nuisance Actions, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 232 (1975).
147. 80 Drive-in, Inc. v. Baxley, 468 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1972); Cactus Corp. v.
State ex rel. Murphy, 14 Ariz. App. 38, 480 P.2d 375 (1971); Bloss v. Paris Township,
380 Mich. 466, 157 N.W.2d 260 (1968).
148. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
149. Id. at 209-11 (citation omitted) (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21
(1971)),
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hibition takes place behind closed doors. This is the position which
the Busch court has taken. Nonetheless, there are strong reasons for
drawing a legal distinction between the treatment of those exhibitions
which are thrust upon an unwilling public and those which are viewed
only by persons who seek them out. A compelling argument can be
made that these latter exhibitions which are not forced upon unwilling
members of the public are not sufficiently public in nature to be in-
cluded within the scope of public nuisance statutes.
Effects of Pornography and the State Interest
A matter that ought not be overlooked in any discussion of the
public interest and obscenity law is the question of what impact the dis-
semination of pornography has on the individual and society. Al-
though a subject of long and heated debate, little empirical evidence
has been gathered on the effects of obscenity in the United States. In
1967, the President's Commission on Obscenity and Pornography was
established by the federal government to study the pornography in-
dustry. 5 ' The commission found four general classes into which as-
sertions about, and objections to, obscenity fell:
(a) [E]rotica is an offense against community standards of good
taste; (b) exposure to erotica is harmful for individuals; (c) the
existence of erotica has harmful consequences for society; and (d)
exposure to erotica is harmless or beneficial for individuals.' 5 '
The commission divided its study of responses to erotica into an
examination of behavioral responses and of attitudinal responses.
Their findings did not support the conclusion that exposure to pornog-
raphy in any way harms or alters sexual behavior." 2 What they did
find is that exposure tends to produce short-term sexual arousal and
that continued exposure frequently leads to satiation.' The results
of an earlier study published in 1962 by the Minnesota Law Review
lend credence to the conclusion of the commission. No support was
found for
[t]he old analogy . . . to the decline of Rome . . . [in which]
it is implied that obscenity, for some reason, exerts some undefined
yet powerful . . . influence on those who contemplate it .... 154
Further, the commission found no evidence of a causal relation
between exposure to obscenity and the incidence of sex crimes or de-
150. Act of Oct. 3, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-100, 81 Stat. 253.
151. COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 142.
152. Id. at 194.
153. Id. at 193-94.
154. Cairns, Paul, & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity
Laws and the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REv. 1009, 1038 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as Sex Censorship].
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linquency. It declined, however, to say that such a connection could
be absolutely disproved. 155
The commission found little effect on individual attitudes regard-
ing either sexuality or sexual morality. 56 The 1962 study, on the other
hand, concluded that attitudes toward sexual behavior might well be
influenced by frequent exposure to pornography. 5 7 The direction of
the attitude change, however-whether toward more liberal or more
conservative attitudes-depends to a large extent on "the nature and
the strength of the preexisting attitudes that the viewer holds."'158 The
commission agreed with this conclusion insofar as it found that in-
creased exposure to pornography tended to liberalize attitudes towards
pornography itself, as distinct from the attitudes towards particular
forms of sexual behavior. 59
The thornier question, though, is the first point raised by the com-
mission-the offense to community standards of decency. Here the
debate turns on the question of how far a free society should go to pro-
tect itself from what it conceives to be threatening expression. The
debaters generally divide into two camps-those who, relying on the
first amendment, fear the state's intrusion into the free viewing and
reading habits of the public and those who fear that the ultimate effect
of free dissemination of pornography will be to undermine the good
moral tone of society. 60  Justice Brennan falls into the first group. In
his Paris Adult Theatre I dissent, he observed that if the state can regu-
late the traffic of obscene materials on the assumption, unproved by
empirical evidence, that such materials lead to antisocial behavior,
it is hard to see how state-ordered regimentation of our minds can
ever be forestalled. For if a State may, in an effort to maintain
or create a particular moral tone, prescribe what its citizens cannot
read or cannot see, then it would seem to follow that in pursuit
of that same objective a State could decree that its citizens must
read certain books or must view certain films.' 6'
155. COMMISsiON, supra note 65, at 242-43.
156. Id. at 214.
157. Sex Censorship, supra note 154, at 1038-39.
158. Id. at 1039.
159. CoMMIssION, supra note 65, at 214.
160. "What makes a society of any sort is community of ideas, not only political
ideas but also ideas about the way its members should behave and govern their lives;
these latter ideas are its morals." P. DEvU.N, TiE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 9 (1965).
See also Elias, Sex Publications and Moral Corruption: The Supreme Court Dilemma,
9 WM. & MAY L. Rnv. 302 (1967).
161. 413 U.S. 49, 110 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Douglas argued
that while he was personally offended by much of this material, "[l]ife in this crowded
modern technological world creates many offensive statements and many offensive
deeds. There is no protection against offensive ideas, only against offensive conduct.
"'Obscenity' at most is the expression of offensive ideas." Id. at 71 (Douglas, J.,
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In the same case, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
rejected the notion that states must await substantive proof of the dele-
terious effect of obscenity. He preferred to defer to the states' judg-
ment as to how they will deal with the moral tone of the community.
States are told by some that they must await a "laissez-faire"
market solution to the obscenity-pornography problem ....
The States, of course, may follow such a "laissez-faire" policy
. . . but nothing in the Constitution compels the States to do so
[W]e reject the claim that the State . . . is here attempt-
ing to control the minds or thoughts of those who patronize
theatres. . . . [T]he mere fact that, as a consequence [of pre-
venting unlimited display or distribution of obscene materials],
some human "utterances" or "thoughts" may be incidentally af-
fected does not bar the State from acting to protect legitimate state
interests. 162
In practice, those who share Brennan's fears of extensive state
regulation have had to content themselves with procedural safe-
guards. 6" When the courts' and public's general good sense and belief
in free expression fail to prevent serious inroads into the availability
of materials, only procedures designed to give the greatest possible lee-
way to protected expression remain to maintain the vitality of free
choice in a free society. The courts have consistently balanced the
states' police power against the interest in being able to receive porno-
graphic materials and have generally found the latter insufficient to
merit protection. Whether obscenity is regulated in the civil courts or
is treated as a crime, the ultimate outcome remains the same-it will
not be protected by the courts. The courts have concluded, despite
strong arguments to the contrary, that the injury is real enough to be
regulated.
dissenting). More recently, Justice Stevens has apparently aligned himself in this camp.
See Marks v. United States, 45 U.S.L.W. 4233, 4235-36 (U.S. March 1, 1977) (Stevens,
J., concurring & dissenting).
162. 413 U.S. at 64-67 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan has voiced a similar
sentiment: "We do not decide whether the policy of the State is wise, or whether it is
based on assumptions scientifically substantiated....
"... Clearly, the state legislature has made the judgment that printed words can
'deprave or corrupt' the reader-that words can incite antisocial or immoral action....
"... The state can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time
the indiscriminate dissemination of materials, the essential character of which is to
degrade sex, will have an eroding effect on moral standards." Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476, 501-02 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring & dissenting). For further argument on
the deleterious effect of free commerce in pornography, see J. KILPATRICK. THE SMUT
PEDDLERS 201-41 (1973); R. KUH, FOOLISH FIGLEAVES?: PORNOGRAPHY IN-AND OUT
OF-COURT 269-316 (1967).
163. See notes 24-44 & accompanying text supra.
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Conclusions
The President's Commission of Obscenity and Pornography rec-
ommended in its 1970 report that all criminal penalties for the ex-
hibition of obscene materials to consenting adults be repealed.
164
They argued that only minors and nonconsenting adults who may be
subjected to public displays of such materials need be protected. 65
Adherents of this position have, however, met with little success; the
commission itself recognized that while these recommendations might
be ideal in light of its finding that pornography has no deleterious ef-
fect on the individual or on the community, still many or all states
would continue to enforce laws against the dissemination of obscenity.
Clearly California is one of these states, as reaffirmed by the Busch
decision. Thus, despite the commission's findings, the threshold ques-
tion of whether or not obscenity laws are valid is rarely addressed by
the courts today. 66 The focal point of controversy has become a some-
what narrower one: how may obscenity be regulated most effectively
so as to strike a balance between the alleged harm, resulting from the
distribution and exhibition of "X-rated" materials and the potential
danger of compromising first amendment rights?
Busch has judicially approved an obscenity procedure which has
been widely accepted across the United States. In so doing, the Busch
court prescribed procedural steps designed to assure that the first
amendment would not be violated by an illegitimate prior restraint.'
67
But serious questions still remain. It is not clear that the proceeding
approved in the case was contemplated or authorized by the legisla-
ture.168 Rather, it would appear that the public nuisance abatement
procedure was intended to reach an altogether different type of of-
fense-an immediate assault upon the five senses. Thus, the Busch
majority's reliance on section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure was
164. CoMMIssioN, supra note 65, at 51.
165. The Commission's proposed legislation provides that "[m]aterial is placed
upon 'public display' if it is placed by the defendant on or in a billboard, viewing screen,
theatre marquee, newsstand, displaying rack, window, showcase, display case or similar
place so that matter bringing it within the definition [of obscenity] is easily visible from
a public thoroughfare or from the property of others." Id. at 67.
166. Few Justices on the Supreme Court have ever suggested that obscenity laws in
general violate the first amendment. Among the few who adopted a "no law means no
law" approach, only one-Justice Brennan-now sits on the Court. See Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, I., dissenting); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Memoirs v. Massachusetts,
383 U.S. 413, 424 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (Douglas & Black, J.J., dissenting).
167. See notes 24-44 & accompanying text supra.
168. See notes 67-104 & accompanying text supra.
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ill-considered. In addition, the court did not address important con-
siderations relating to the standard of proof or the use of a jury.'69
It is suggested that it is not necessary to sacrifice the use of injunc-
tive relief in obscenity regulation in order to eliminate the problem
posed by the questionable use of the civil abatement procedure and
to afford defendants greater constitutional protection. It is recom-
mended that the legislature amend the penal code' 70 by enacting a stat-
ute which generally approves of the Busch procedure but which makes
a few significant modifications. It is suggested that the penal obscenity
law, rather than the civil nuisance law, be amended, in order to remove
nuisance from the consideration of obscenity altogether. Obscenity has
traditionally been treated as a criminal offense, and a penal code pro-
vision generally authorizing the Busch procedure in the criminal law
context will establish a cohesive obscenity law for California.
More specifically, it is suggested that before any criminal action
can be instituted, the district or city attorney should be required to seek
a declaratory judgment that specific materials are obscene and an in-
junction against their exhibition. In this way, the exhibitor will be put
on notice as to what he can legally exhibit or distribute before he is
subjected to criminal penalties. It would also relieve the prosecution
of the burden of proving scienter in a future criminal prosecution, 17 1
because once the distributor has been judicially notifed that further
exhibition of specific materials is forbidden, he will have no cause to
complain that he was ignorant of the contents of those materials or their
legally obscene character. Furthermore, the violation of an injunction
would subject the exhibitor to penalties for contempt of court.'
2
The above procedure has been used in a few states.' Other
states have made the choice between injunctive relief and criminal pros-
ecution a matter of prosecutorial discretion, as in Busch.'14  Typically,
169. See notes 46-66 & accompanying text supra. Since the cases involved an
appeal from an order granting a demurrer, those issues were not presented.
170. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 311-12.1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1977).
171. COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 68.
172. See, e.g., OKLA. STATS. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.22 (West Supp. 1976).
173. See generally, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 281 (West 1970) (stating
that declaratory and injunctive proceedings are "condition[s] precedent to the institution
of any [criminal] proceedings . . . for dissemination of obscene books"); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 99-31-19 (1972) ("Any mailable matter . . . following the entry of a judgment
that it is obscene . . . is subject to [criminal prosecution]"). The commission report
also recommended that "criminal prosecutions shall be brought prior to the obtaining of
a declaration . . . only in cases of material which is unquestionably within the applicable
definitional provision. In all other cases, the provisions of this Act shall be used prior to
prosecution. . . ." COMMISSION, supra note 65, at 69.
174. E.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.285 (Vernon Supp. 1976); N.Y. Civ. Pac. LAw §
6330 (McKinney Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1040.14 (West Supp. 1976).
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the choice is given to the prosecutor either by a statutory statement that
the injunctive procedure is discretionary or by a separate statute which
declares obscenity to be a public nuisance as well as a criminal of-
fense. " ' This approach to the problem is less satisfactory inasmuch
as it leaves the exhibitor uncertain as to what legal sanctions he may
face. He is left in doubt as to whether his materials will be protected
(since he will be reluctant to call attention to himself by seeking de-
claratory relief), and he is also left wondering whether he might face
criminal prosecution or the less risky civil proceeding. Entrusting this
choice between criminal and civil actions to prosecutorial discretion al-
lows too much room for an irregular application of the law.
A second area that should be covered by the proposed statutory
amendment relates to the Supreme Court's mandate that an adjudica-
tion declaring a book or film to be obscene not be held ex parte.76
Busch has followed this lead by reading into the public nuisance abate-
ment law the requirement that an adversary hearing on the issue of
obscenity be held before an injunction can issue. 171 It is recommended
that the legislature directly incorporate this requirement into the com-
prehensive penal code amendment.
A third area that should be treated by the suggested amendment
involves the problems which arise because the definition of obscenity
is inherently uncertain. Because of the potential for mistaken fact-
finding, it is further suggested that a penal code amendment require
the district or city attorney to prove the obscenity of the material be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Where the integrity of the first amendment
is involved, protected expression should be given all possible leeway.
This provision would recognize that need. For the same reason, it is
also recommended that provision be made for a jury trial on the issue
of obscenity. Several states have incorporated the jury trial into their
civil obscenity laws.' 78 The President's Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography, recognizing that the question of obscenity has historically
been entrusted to the jury, has also suggested that the jury trial be pro-
vided as a matter of right.179  The jury trial will assure that a broad
crosssection of the community's tastes and values is represented in ob-
scenity litigation. The added precaution provided by the Missouri
court-giving the trial court the power to find material constifutionally
protected even after a jury has found it obscene'° 0-is also desirable.
175. GA. CODE ANNt. § 26-2103 (1968).
176. See notes 29-33 & accompanying text supra.
177. 17 Cal. 3d at 59, 550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.
178. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272 § 28D (West 1970); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-
31-13(2) (1972). See also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 563.285 (Vernon Supp. 1976).
179. CoMMissioN, supra note 65, at 68, 464.
180. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975).
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With these modifications of the Busch decision, the integrity of the first
amendment will be protected to the greatest extent possible in a society
in which the tastes and standards of the community dictate against the
toleration of obscenity in its midst.
Sharon Anne Watkins*
* Member, Second Year Class.
